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Monetary  unions  generally  boost  financial  markets.  But  European  private  capital  markets 
have progressed at an unsatisfactory pace even with the euro. What accounts for this? We 
focus  on  an  increasingly  key  financial  infrastructure:  Rating  Agencies  (RAs).  Taking  an 
international perspective, we show that: (i) financial market development increases with the 
presence  of  national  RAs;  (ii)  in  four  studied  Asian  countries,  smaller-sized  companies 
disproportionately  hold  a  rating  from  national  RAs,  while  disregarding  the  global  RAs 
(Moody’s, S&P, Fitch). We argue that the absence of European RAs may currently limit the 
extent of rated companies and financial market evolution in Euroland. 
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Introduction 
There are only three traditional Global Rating Agencies (GRAs): Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch. Though originated in the USA, in recent years, GRAs have come to 
play a key role in the functioning of international financial markets. All across the world, their 
ratings  are  one  of  the  main  worries  of  sovereigns,  municipal  authorities,  banks  and  non 
financial companies. To each of them, any downgrade would negatively impinge on their 
capitalization and increase financial outlays. GRAs’ ratings have even been adopted as the 
keystone of financial regulation, e.g. they play a part in the regulatory revision, which G-10 
countries  have recently  agreed  to  introduce  by 2008  in  terms  of  banks’  minimum  capital 
requirements (Basel 2; BCBS, 1999 and 2000). 
Though their activity has proved useful in the evaluation of borrowers’ creditworthiness, 
in many instances the reputation of the GRAs has been put at stake. On one hand, according 
to many observers – even disregarding the recent accusations relating to the sub-prime crisis – 
GRAs proved laggard and procyclical during the Asian crisis (IMF, 1999; Bongini, Laeven 
and Majnoni 2002) and failed to timely predict mega-bankruptcies such as Enron, WorldCom 
and Parmalat. These errors, the agencies' growing importance, the low degree of competition 
among them and the absence of outside scrutiny have made the financial community and 
regulators increasingly nervous in the USA, the biggest market for ratings. This called for 
more  thorough  oversight  of  the  agencies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  activity  of  GRAs  in 
developing countries does not appear as punctual as in developed countries. S&P, Moody's 
and Fitch were, in fact, so oblivious to Asia's gathering financial problems in the mid-1990s; 
they  made  repeated  downgrades  but  only  once  the  problems  were  widely  known.  The 
implication in these cases is that the agencies seem reluctant to face the broader consequences 
of their decisions. By moving slowly, they may avoid the accusation that their actions might 
lead to financial turmoil of one kind or another. Rating agencies argue that speed is not their 
job-only accuracy. Nevertheless, when they promptly move their rating they frequently tend 
to behave pro-cyclically (Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz, 1999; Bhatia, 2002). In addition, especially in 
developing  countries,  the  evidence  suggests  that  ratings  are  excessively  tied  to  sovereign 
ratings (Ferri, Liu and Majnoni, 2001) and that the information content of the ratings is less 
accurate with respect to what observed in developed countries (Ferri, 2004; Ferri and Liu, 
2003 and 2005). Perhaps the biggest shadow hanging over the rating industry is its perceived 
lack of competition (Partnoy, 1999; White, 2002). The business functions as an oligopoly or 
almost so. Upstarts have a hard time breaking in rating markets because it takes years, even 
decades, to build sufficient reputation. 
Ironically,  the  only  power  which  America's  SEC  really  has  over  rating  agencies  is  to 
designate which ones are acceptable – and for three decades that has effectively impeded 
competition. Plenty of pension funds and other investors stipulate that their bond investments 
must have a rating from a "Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization", the SEC's 
designation. The fact that the SEC recently designated four more agencies – Dominion Bond 
Rating, A.M. Best, R&I and JCR – as "nationally recognized" may be misleading. S&P and 
Moody's still dominate the market, there and worldwide. The industry remains a duopoly or, 
at best, an oligopoly in important new areas such as structured finance (i.e., repackaged pools 
of  assets).  In  such  a  context,  sometimes  GRAs  try  to  acquire  new  markets  by  issuing 
unsolicited ratings – based solely on public information – but such practice is perceived as 
“an extortion” by issuers who are forced to pay to obtain a more accurate rating based not 
only on public information. 
Another problem to deal with is that there is little price competition among agencies. And 
yet  the  rating  agencies  share  some  of  the  problems  of  the  analysts.  The most  obvious  is   3 
conflicts of interest. Not only are they beholden for their fees to companies whose securities 
they rate; they often sell the same clients a parcel of advisory services. Just as for audit firms, 
which did likewise until Sarbanes-Oxley prevented them, the temptation is to keep up ratings 
in return. 
In  spite  of  these  unsatisfactory  aspects  of  the  rating  industry  is  essential  to  improve 
financial markets. Rating agencies’ activity is precious to reduce information asymmetries. 
Collecting information is expensive, and rating agencies are able to re-organize information in 
an efficient way. Thus, an improvement in rating agencies functioning could have far reaching 
positive effects. In this context, we must evaluate whether countries contemplating a faster 
development of their financial markets should rely only on GRAs or whether they can also 
benefit from having national rating agencies (NRAs), independent from the “big three”. The 
solution is not obvious. For example, Europe and Asia have a different track record in this 
respect: the few NRAs started in Europe were soon acquired by GRAs, while Asia still holds 
on to several independent NRAs, though none of them covers the whole of Asia. 
But  why  some  issuers  should  prefer  obtaining  a  rating  from  NRAs  rather  than  from 
GRAs?  On  one  hand,  NRAs  could  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  accessing  more 
appropriate  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  in  which  issuers  operate  and  also  NRAs 
could have more incentives to deal with local entities. Also, as cursory evidence suggests, 
NRA  ratings  might  be  supplied  at  lower  fees.  On  the  other  hand,  NRAs  could  be  less 
independent  than  GRAs,  being  the  former  more  subject  to  influence  by  national  issuers. 
Instead  GRAs  tend  to  apply  the  same  standardized  methodology  in  attributing  ratings, 
regardless  the  environment  in  which  firms  operate.  Thus,  GRA  ratings  could  be  more 
informative  and  valuable  for  investors.  In  all,  companies  might  face  a  trade-off  between 
obtaining a less costly – but possibly less valuable – rating from NRAs or opting for a higher-
reputation – but more costly – GRA rating. Following this reasoning, companies would select 
GRAs or NRAs depending on their objectives. Larger/global companies interested in gaining 
international recognition and aiming at paving the global financial market might be willing to 
pay more to obtain GRA ratings. On the contrary, smaller/domestic-focused firms might lean 
on NRAs. As a result, rather than fierce competition we might expect a division of labor to 
prevail with GRAs focusing on the former companies and NRAs concentrating on the latter 
ones. 
Indeed,  the  presence  of  both  NRAs  and  GRAs  could  improve  the  rating  market  by 
enlarging  the  number  of rated  companies  and,  as  consequence,  boosting  financial  market 
development. 
According to the argument above, the fact that Europe lacks its NRAs may help explain 
why the progress of private securities markets in Euroland after the Monetary Union has been 
lower than expected (Hartmann et al. 2003; Cappiello et al. 2006). Europe features, in fact, so 
many unrated domestic-focused/small-sized companies probably interested in NRAs – where 
available  –  which  could  so  become  potential  issuers.  Thus,  the  question  whether  Europe 
would stand to benefit from having its own NRAs is a cogent policy issue, more so now that 
Basel 2 appears to offer an important window of opportunity for new actors to enter this 
business. 
Our paper tries to make two contributions to this debate by shedding light on some of the 
key hypotheses put forward above. Our starting point is testing whether countries endowed 
with NRAs enjoy deeper financial markets. As we will state, even a positive result of this test 
should  be  interpreted  with  caution,  since  what  appears  a  causal  link  between  NRAs  and 
financial market development might depend on omitted third factor. This is the reason why 
we use an instrumental variable approach to check whether the NRA impact is robust. The   4 
second  contribution  of  our  paper  consists  in  studying  Asia  where  the  contemporaneous 
presence of NRAs and GRAs allows us to tell apart whether the two types of rating agencies 
do specialize in different clientele. To this end, in particular, it will be interesting to verify 
whether there is evidence that NRAs specialize in issuing ratings to smaller/domestic-focused 
entities. 
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 provides some detail on the structure of the rating 
industry. We then turn to test whether the presence of NRAs associates with more developed 
financial markets (Section 3). Section 4 is devoted to shed light on the hypothesized division 
of labor between GRAs and NRAs. We accomplish this based on evidence from Asia, the 
region of the world where a significant number of NRAs do business alongside with GRAs. 
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Figure 1  Source: Our calculations on Financial Times Interactive data for Winter 1998-99 and Winter 2004. 
 
 
1.  The Structure of the Rating Agency Industry With a Focus on Asia 
The rating industry has a very peculiar structure; it is characterized by the presence of 
three big-global players (the global rating agencies; GRAs): Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) and Fitch-IBCA.
2 The rating activity originated in 1909 when John Moody’s issued its 
first rating and since then it has expanded all over the world. GRAs have acquired a consistent 
coverage  and  market  power:  their ratings  are  perceived  as  the  most reliable  and  accurate 
opinion on issuers and financial instruments. Though rating banks is also important, the bulk 
of  GRAs’  business  is  in  rating  corporates  and  structured  finance,  GRAs’  business  is  for 
                                                 
2 The US Department of Justice labeled Moody’s and S&P as “partner monopoly”, Fitch and DCR as distanced 
followers.  Consistently  with  this,  Norden  and  Weber  (2004)  find  that  reviews  for  downgrade  by  S&P  and 
Moody’s have the largest impact on credit default swaps and shares.   5 
almost ¾ US based with bank ratings more geographically widespread. In addition, various 
mergers  and  acquisitions  by  GRAs  of  other  small  local  rating  agencies  has  increased  the 
industry concentration (e.g., in 2000 Fitch bought DCR and Thomson BankWatch). GRAs’ 
coverage differs across the various regions of the world. Outside the US, GRAs’ penetration 
is  highest  in  Europe,  smallest  in  Asia,  intermediate  in  Latin  America  and  Africa.  But, 
conversely  to  market  coverage, t he  number  of  ratings  is  much  larger  in  Asia  (and  Latin 
America), where GRAs’ penetration is lower, than in Europe (Figure 1). 
This is because, Asia can rely upon several national rating agencies (NRAs), which – as 
we will argue – could represent a valuable opportunity to boost financial markets (Figure 2). 
NRAs’  coverage  is  most  significant  in  Japan,  South  Korea,  Malaysia  and  India.  In  such 
countries NRAs’ activity is considerable.
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Figure 2 Source: Our calculations on Financial Times Interactive data for Winter 2004 
 
In particular, Japan has three rating agencies: two of them are relatively well structured 
(Japan Credit Rating Agency, JCR; and Japan Rating and Investment Information, R&I) and a 
third one is less structured (Mikuni). South Korea features four NRAs, beside the activity 
performed  there  by  JCR  and  R&I:  Korea  Investment  Service  (KIS),  Korea  Rating  (KR), 
National Information and Credit Evaluation (NICE) and AM Best. Malaysia has two NRAs: 
Malaysian  Rating  Corporation  Berhad  (MARC)  and  Rating  Agency  Malaysia  (RAM).  In 
India there are three NRAs: Investment Information and Credit Rating Agency (ICRA), Credit 
Rating Information Services of India (CRISIL) and Credit Analysis & Research (CARE). 
None of these several Asian NRAs, yet, can be considered regional because their business is 
                                                 
3 See also Ferri, Kang and Lee (2006).   6 
mostly tied to their nation of origin (only JCR and R&I have some non trivial business out of 
their nation of origin). 
Though, these NRAs originated recently (none of them was established before 1985), in 
these countries they issue numerous ratings compared to GRAs (Figure 3) and they are very 
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Figure 3  Source: Our calculations on Bloomberg data for 2004. 
. 
Differently from the US tradition, NRAs in Japan originated with a strong support from 
regulation. Ratings were a necessary tool to obtain regulatory approval to issue bonds. After 
1985, many Japan corporate bonds were required to have a minimum credit rating in order for 
the  issue  to  be  approved.  While  this  requirement  was  abolished  in  January  1996,  other 
regulatory obligations remained tied to credit rating. 
Some of the Asian NRAs are owned, at least in part, by consortia of financial institutions 
(e.g. ICRA is mainly owned by Indian banks; RAM is owned by 49 financial institutions) 
which may receive credit ratings of their own from the controlled NRA and may also have 
important business relationships with borrowers that receive ratings from the controlled NRA 
in turn. This ownership structure – probably stemming from the need to rely on private sector 
assistance in developing credit analysis – poses potential conflicts of interests, which should 
require greater efforts to ensure the integrity of the rating process. 
Based on the scant literature addressing this issue, the growing coverage of NRAs seems a 
positive signal because the market seems to take into account both NRA and GRA ratings 
when pricing securities. For instance, Packer (2000) shows that a combination of NRA and 
GRA ratings predicts spreads on securities secondary market trading more accurately than any 
of the two classes taken separately. JCIF (2001) survey finds that, in the opinion of Japanese 
corporations, NRAs do not differ from GRAs in terms of market influence and recognition   7 
but NRAs get a strong minus as regards global activity while they are reputed somewhat 
better than GRAs in terms of: (i) placing more importance on factors relating to Japanese 
business practice (industrial specialization);  (ii) providing more persuasive reasons as to the 
level of the assigned rating and/or of the subsequent changes (rating fairness)
4 (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4  Source: Our calculations on JCIF (2001). 
 
Thus, issuers may benefit obtaining ratings both from GRAs and from NRAs. Possibly, 
NRAs’ judgment on issuer reliability places a larger weight on the local environment and 
business  practice,  which  depends  on idiosyncratic  aspects  of the  specific  country.  On  the 
contrary, GRAs may be keener to use standardized rating criteria for all issuers in the world, 
regardless of local business practice, and this could sometimes deliver an under-estimation of 
issuers’ creditworthiness.
5 Indeed, studying the case of Japan, Packer (2000) documents that 
the ratings assigned by NRAs are, on average, 3.5 notches higher than GRA ones. However, 
he also shows that, this notwithstanding, NRA ratings are more related to rated companies’ 
financial ratios than GRA ratings. By the same token, running an event study on the stock 
                                                 
4 There is a third aspect where NRAs outperform GRAs according to the JCIF survey: the fact that they are 
designated  rating  agencies.  Of  course,  this  has  to  do  with  institutional  decisions  and  not  with  economic 
efficiency. 
5 A remarkable example that it may take an extra effort for GRAs to capture local business practice is offered by 
Yamaoka and Fukutomi (2003). These two S&P analysts show that, at some point, S&P started factoring loan 
waivers in its ratings assigned to Japanese corporations. The study concludes that the loan waiver practice should 
remain popular in Japan in the near future. One may observe that loan waivers in Japan depend – to a large 
extent – on the role of the main bank, which, in case of distress of a related company, will choose to suffer 
haircuts on its own loans and keep the company’s debt payments to third parties going as scheduled, rather than 
loosing its face. Thus, it seems that the loan waiver business practice was at work in Japan well before S&P 
accounted for it in its corporate ratings. This exemplifies two aspects. On the negative, GRAs ratings may be 
biased as they do not give enough weight to local business practice. On the positive, over time also GRAs can 
have the incentive/ability to tailor their ratings to the specificities of the country.   8 
market impact of rating changes in Japan, Lacitignola (2007) finds that the impact is generally 
larger for rating changes enacted by NRAs vis-à-vis those enacted by GRAs.
6 
To  conclude,  the  evidence  discussed  in  this  Section  supports  the  hypothesis  that  both 
NRAs  and  GRAs  give  a  value  added  with  their  ratings.  Since  GRAs  operate  (virtually) 
everywhere in the world while only some countries have their NRAs, we can thus imagine 
that financial markets could grow more in the countries enjoying the presence of both types of 
rating agencies. Now we turn to test this hypothesis. 
 
2.  Presence of National Rating Agencies and Financial Market Development 
In this Section we analyze the possible effects deriving from the presence of national 
rating agencies (NRAs) on the development of financial markets. To control for whether the 
presence of NRAs is just proxying for some other factor, we instrument the NRA variable 
using an index of the quality of information and other variables relating to the functioning of 
financial markets. , so to disentangle whether the presence of NRAs is just proxying for better 
information quality or whether it has an independent effect – by expanding the number of 
rated entities, we argue – on financial market development. Should the impact of the NRAs 
survive after instrumenting, this would suggest some causal link might be at work. 
We base our analysis on the approach proposed in the widely cited papers by La Porta et 
al.  (1997  and  1998).  As  a  proxy  for  financial  market  development  we  use  two  different 
dependent variables: (i) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GNP in 1994 scaled by a 
rough measure of the fraction of the stock market held by outside investor (EXTKGNP), in 
this  we  just  replicate  La  Porta  et  al.’s  key  regression  by  adding  additional  explanatory 
variables; (ii) the ratio of private bonds/GDP (PB/GDP), to capture an additional dimension of 
financial market development not studied by La Porta et al., which is potentially affected even 
more by the availability of credit ratings. Indeed, the agencies specialize in debt issues and the 
impact of rating changes is larger/more common for bonds rather than stocks (Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Gropp and Richard, 2001; Steiner and Heinke, 2001). 
As independent variables we use the GDP growth (GDPGR), the rule of law (RLAW), the 
presence of national rating agencies (NRA) for which we focus on the sub-classification of 
the  significant  and  old  rating  agencies  (SONRA),  i.e.  those  rating  agencies  that  were 
established early on (OLDNRA) – by 1990 four years before the year in which EXTKGNP 
was measured by La Porta et al. – and show significant activity. In addition, we consider 
dummy variables which indicate the type of legal system of countries; La Porta et al. (1997) 
find that such variables influence the development of financial markets. Such variables are 
FRELO  for  the  French  civil  law  countries,  GERLO  for  German  civil  law  countries  and 
SCALO for the Scandinavian countries, while ENGLO – for common law countries – will be 
the omitted dummy in our regressions. Variables are summarized in Table 1. The countries 
                                                 
6 Li, Shin and Moore (2006) reach opposite conclusions. They evaluate the effect of rating changes by Moody’s, 
S&P, R&I and JCR on the Japanese stock market with a sample period from the 1990s through early 2003. They 
find  that  the  GRAs’  rating  changes  are  more  influential  than  the  NRAs  for  rating  downgrades  and  that, 
consistently with previous research, upgrades are benign events and this holds true for GRAs as well as NRAs. 
While such different results could be due to various factors – e.g. the fact that Lacitignola disregards financial 
firms, while Li et al. (2006) do; the fact that Lacitignola’s sample is 2 years longer that that used by Li et al. 
(2006); the fact that Lacitignola’s market model is built on industry market returns rather than on average stock 
market returns as in Li et al. (2006) – it is worth noticing that Li et al. (2006) present results only up to an 
unusually short t+3 window while, according to Lacitignola (2007) the most noticeable differences between 
GRAs and NRAs materialize only over a longer time window.   9 
considered are 49.
7 Table 2 offers some descriptive statistics on the variables. Regression 
results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 1. Definition and Description of the Variables 
 
Variable  Description 
EXTKGNP  Ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product for 1994 (source: La Porta 
et al., 1997) 
GDPGR  Average annual percent growth of per capita gross domestic product for the period 1970-1993. Source: World 
Development Report 1995 (from: La Porta et al., 1997) 
LGNP  Log of GNP (from: La Porta et al., 1997) 
RLAW  Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Average of the months of     April and October of the 
monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and 
order. Source: International Country Risk Guide (from: La Porta et al., 1997) 
NRA  National Rating Agencies, this variable considers Moody’s, S&P and Fitch for the USA and all the other rating 
agencies  for  the  other  countries.  This  dummy  takes  value  1  for:  Argentina,  Chile,  India,  Israel,  Japan, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, USA. (source: 
our calculations on Financial Times Interactive) 
OLDNRA  Old NRA (established by 1990). This excludes from NRA the following countries (for which we report in 
parenthesis the year of establishment of their NRA) Argentina (1992), Israel (1992), Pakistan (1994), Peru 
(certainly after 1992, year of establishment of the Argentinian nother company), Taiwan (1998), Thailand  
(1993). 
SONRA  Significant OLDNRA. This captures the countries which satisfy OLDNRAs and whose NRAs have significant 
activity. This excludes from OLDNRA two countries: Philippines (whose NRA had only 51 issue ratings in 
Winter 1988-89,  the oldest  information we could recover  from  Financial Times Interactive) and Portugal 
(whose NRA had only 13 issue  ratings  in Winter 1988-89, the  oldest information we  could recover from 
Financial Times Interactive). 
FRELO  French civil law countries  (from: La Porta et al., 1997) 
GERLO  German civil law countries  (from: La Porta et al., 1997) 
SCALO  Scandinavian countries (source: La Porta et al., 1997) 
ANTIDR  An index  aggregating  shareholder rights. The  index  is formed by adding 1 when: (1)  the country  allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the 
General  Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in 
place;  or  (5)  when  the  minimum  percentage  of  share  capital  that  entitles  a  shareholder  to  call  for  an 
Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median). The index ranges from 
0 to 5. Source: Company Law or Commercial  Code (from: La Porta et al., 1997). 
ONESHV  Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code of the country requires that ordinary shares carry one 
vote per share, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, this variable equals one when the law prohibits the existence of 
both multiple-voting and non-voting ordinary shares and does not allow firms to set a maximum number of 
votes per shareholder irrespective of the number of shares she owns, and 0 otherwise. (Source: Company Law 
or Commercial Code (from: La Porta et al., 1997). 
DFIRM  Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in millions) in 1984 (from: 
La Porta et al., 1997). 
CREDR  An  index  aggregating  creditor  rights.  The  index  is  formed  by  adding  1  when:  (1)  the  country  imposes 
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors 
are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) 
the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization; (4) 
secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets 
of a bankrupt firm. The index ranges from 0 to 4. (from: La Porta et al., 1997). 
PB/GDP  Ratio of private bonds issued in the country to GDP (source: Chan-Lee & Ahn, 2001) 
QOI  information quality of national financial systems (source: Chan-Lee & Ahn, 2001) 
 
 
Focusing on stock market capitalization, we adopt the preferred specification estimated by 
La Porta et al. (1997), where the pivotal role is played by the One-Share-One-Vote variable. 
Furthermore, we consider two additional estimates beside the original one by La Porta et al.. 
                                                 
7 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, UK, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.    10 
The first one includes the dummy SONRA, capturing the possible effects for countries having 
old NRAs with a considerable activity. Finally, we re-estimate this last regression by means 
of  the  instrumental  variables  approach.  This  is  done  in  order  to  address  the  potential 
endogeneity between SONRA and the dependent variable. In other words, one cannot exclude 
that  an  omitted  variable  –  e.g.  early  financial  market  reform  –  causes  both  the  early 
establishment of an NRA and also a high value of the dependent variable capturing financial 
market development. Here, we use as instruments QOI – the quality of information variable 
derived from Chan Lee and Ahn (2001) – DFIRM – the ratio of the number of domestic firms 
listed in a given country to its population derived from La Porta et al. (1997) – and CREDR – 
the index aggregating creditor rights also derived from La Porta et al. (1997). 
 
Table 2. Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
EXTKGNP  0.3960  0.2500  0.0600  1.4800 
GDPGR  3.7876  3.2700  0.3000  11.5600 
LGNP  11.7255  11.6800  8.4900  15.6700 
RLAW  6.8465  6.7800  1.9000  10.0000 
NRA  0.3061  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
OLDNRA  0.1837  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
SONRA  0.1429  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
FRELO  0.4286  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
GERLO  0.1224  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
SCALO  0.0816  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
ANTIDR  2.4286  2.0000  0.0000  5.0000 
ONESHV  0.2041  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
DFIRM  2.1405  1.3180  1.1500  12.760 
CREDR  2.2978  2.0000  0.0000  4.0000 
PB/GDP  0.1693  0.0870  0.0000  1.0590 
QOI  4.8971  5.0695  0.9280  9.5778 
 
 
We do not comment the results of column 1 which is the same as in La Porta et al. (1997). 
GDP growth is significant in 3.1 and 3.2 but not in 3.3. Our results in 3.3 (but not in 3.1 
and 3.2) confirm the expectation that the presence of NRAs associates with deeper stock 
markets:  SONRA  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  10%  level  while  the  R
2  decreases 
considerably  (Table  3).  The  R
2  for  the  OLS  model  is  much  higher  than  that  for  the 
instrumented model but this is due to endogenous matter. Besides, the Rule of Law variable is 
always significant and the One-Share-One-Vote variable is barely significant at the 10% level 
in 3.1 and 3.2 but not in 3.3. Hansen’s J overindentification test confirms that SONRA may be 
treated  as  endogenous  in  the  estimate,  while  the  F  test  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  the 
instruments  are  jointly  significant  in  explaining  SONRA.  Thus,  after  controlling  for  the 
correlation of SONRA with errors we find that the development of rating agencies with the 
rule of law variable are able to explain the development of stock markets. 
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Table 3 
External Market Capitalization of Equity/GNP Regressions 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of 49 countries around the world- The dependent variable is “External 
Cap.”. The independent variables are (1) GDP Growth; (2) Log GNP; (3) Rule of law; (4) French origin; (5) German origin; 
(6) Scandinavian origin; (7) Antidirector Rights; (8) One-share=One-vote; (9) Significant Old Rating Agencies. T-stats are 
shown in parentheses. * stands for 10% significance level, ** stands for 5% significance level,*** 1% significance level. 
 
Independent Variables  Dep.var.:External Cap/GNP 
  Sp. 3.1  Sp. 3.2  Sp. 3.3 
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Observations  45  45  44 
Adjusted R
2  0.5401  0.5815  0.533 
F test for joint insignificance    5.84***  3.08*** 
Hansen J overidentification test instruments      4.494 
F test for instruments      0.20 
 
 
Now we move to the second equation on the determinants of private bond issuance, we 
adopt  also  here  the  specification  estimated  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997)  and  we  include  as 
independent  variable  also  SONRA,  as  already  done  before.  We  firstly  estimate  the  4.1 
equation without the inclusion of SONRA, then we take into account the impact of SONRA 
on  private  bond  issuance  (4.2);  finally  we  estimate  the  equation  4.3  where  SONRA  is 
instrumented in the same way as above to control for it being endogenously determined. 
Specifically,  it  turns  out  that  the  GDP  Growth  variable  is  significant  in  4.2  and  4.3 
(whenever we include SONRA) and – something not really intuitive – bears a negative sign 
(Table 4). Both Log GNP and Rule of Law have the expected positive sign and are significant 
(even though log GNP is not significant in 4.3). Interestingly, we record some visible change 
in  the  legal  origin  variables.  The  French  origin  dummy  is  no  longer  significant  but  the 
German origin and the Scandinavian origin dummies turn positive and are weakly significant. 
The  variable  One-Share-One-Vote  is  no  longer  significant.  Whenever  included  in  the 
estimation,  SONRA  is  highly  significant  (1%)  and  still  remains  highly  significant  in  the 
instrumented estimation (5%). Hansen’s J overindentification test confirms that SONRA may 
be  treated  as  endogenous  in the  estimate,  while  the  F  test  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  the 
instruments are jointly significant in explaining SONRA. Thus, it turns out that NRAs bestow 
large  effects  on  the  development  of  national  private  bond  markets.  Indeed,  it  seems  that 
ratings contribute even more in private bond markets development than in the development of   12 
stock markets. However, we cannot drastically conclude in this way because may be that the 
problem is in choice of an adequate measure of the development of financial markets. 
Incidentally, this evidence suggests that the determinants of financial market development 
may change depending on whether we measure this development on the stock market or on 
the  private  bond  market.  Thus,  further  thoughts  should  be  given  to  whether  measuring 
financial market development exclusively in terms of stock market is appropriate. 
 
Table 4 
Private Bonds/GDP Regressions 
Ordinary  least  squares  regressions  of  the  cross-section  of  49  countries  around  the  world-  The  dependent  variable  is 
“PB/GDP”. The independent variables are (1) GDP Growth; (2) Log GNP; (3) Rule of law; (4) French origin; (5) German 
origin;  (6)  Scandinavian  origin;  (7)  Antidirector  Rights;  (8)  One-share=One-vote;  (9)  Significant  Old  Rating  Agencies. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * stands for 10% significance level, ** stands for 5% significance level,*** 1% 
significance level. 
 
Independent Variables  Dep.var.:PB/GDP 
  Sp. 4.1  Sp. 4.2  Sp. 4.3 
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Observations  48  48  46 
Adjusted R
2  0.5609  0.6253  0.4213 
F test for joint insignificance  9.16***  8.24***  6.65*** 
Hansen J overidentification test instruments      1.892 
F test for instruments      0.20 
 
 
3.  The Business Specificity of National Rating Agencies: Evidence From Asia 
The evidence above suggests that National Rating Agencies (NRAs) may be an important 
factor  to  promote  financial  market  development.  The  basic  intuition  behind  this  runs  as 
follows. Financial markets will develop more strongly if, ceteris paribus, a country increases 
the  number  of  rated  companies.  The  availability  of  more  rated  companies  will,  in  fact, 
improve the information available to intermediaries and investors. In turn, market failures 
depending on information asymmetries will be reduced and financial markets will be boosted 
by expanding both demand and supply. Indeed, nourishing NRAs can be key to increasing the 
number of rated companies in the country. This is because the presence in the country of the 
three  big  players  (Moody’s,  S&P,  Fitch,  the  global  rating  agencies;  GRAs)  may  be  not   13 
enough. By and large, the GRAs tend to specialize in the top rank of companies, i.e. the 
country’s  companies  which  are  larger/more  internationalized.  In  part,  this  depends  on 
demand: larger/more internationalized companies are more inclined to get a rating from the 
GRAs as this rating will be more reputed in the international financial markets, where they 
may wish to issue debt. For another part, however, GRAs may chose to rate larger/more 
internationalized companies because these are the typical companies they do business with all 
over the world. By the same token, NRAs are likely more cost effective – and charge lower 
fees – at rating smaller/less internationalized companies, whose assessment depends more on 
getting local – often soft – information and understanding the local business practice. All in 
all,  it  appears  that  GRAs  might  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  rating  larger/more 
internationalized  companies  while  NRAs  might  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  rating 
smaller/less  internationalized  companies.  This  configures  the  possibility  that  GRAs  and 
NRAs,  rather  than  engaging  in  fierce  competition  across  the  board,  might  largely  be 
complementary and specialize in different clientele. If so, a country lacking NRAs will have 
fewer rated companies and, consequently, less developed financial markets. 
While the econometric evidence in Section 3 is supportive of this argument, it is now time 
to verify whether, in fact, NRAs are more specialized in domestic-focused corporations. We 
investigate this hypothesis using rating data
8 for Japan, South Korea, India and Malaysia for 
non financial corporations only.
9 As already mentioned, we focus on Asia because this is the 
area of the world where the presence of NRAs is largest and this allows identifying any 
NRAs’ company specialization pattern. We consider all issuers obtaining a rating either from 
GRAs or from NRAs or from both. In addition, we consider issuers’ size along with as a 
proxy of their degree of internationalization. if they have shares are quoted in other market 
other than their domestic market (this is a proxy for internationalization). We measure issuers’ 
size as the mean total asset in 2002. As a proxy for a company’s degree of internationalization 
we distinguish whether a company is listed in a foreign stock market, beside being listed on 
its own domestic market. Naturally, one could think of many alternative ways to capture 
internationalization  but  our  proxy  is  particularly  valuable  to  convey  that  form  of 
internationalization which could make GRA ratings more appealing. A firm which is also 
listed abroad is, in fact, the best potential candidate to issue securities in the international 
market and, as such, the most interested in obtaining a GRA rating, well recognized by global 
investors. 
Among the companies obtaining a rating (also) from GRAs the share of companies listed 
also internationally is significantly larger than among companies receiving a rating only from 
NRAs. In India and Malaysia this share is 100.0% for the former group and, respectively, 69.1 
and 77.4 for the latter group (Figure 5). The two figures for Japan are, respectively, 94.6 and 
69.3%. only in the case of Korea we find the opposite: respectively, 48.3 and 65.2%. 
 
                                                 
8 Source: Bloomberg data base. 
9 In  further  work  we  intend  analyze  the  impact  of  financial  ratios  on  credit  ratings  and  financial  ratios  of 
financial firms have a particular structure that needs to be controlled for.   14 
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Fig. 5 Source: Our calculations on Bloomberg data between 1990 and may 2005. 
 
The difference between GRAs’ clientele and NRAs’ one is even more blatant when we 
look at company size. The average size of the companies obtaining a rating only from NRAs 
is much smaller than that of those companies receiving a rating (also) from GRAs. The ratio 
of the average size of the former group to the average size of the latter group is 5.5% in 
Malaysia, 9.7% in Japan, 12.8% in India and 25.9% in Korea (Figure 6). 
Our evidence on Asia, thus, supports the view that GRAs and NRAs do specialize in 
rating different clientele. In other words, there seems to be a division of labor between GRAs 
– specializing in larger-sized/internationalized companies – and NRAs – concentrating on 
smaller-sized/domestic-focused  companies.  Consequently,  this  evidence  supports  the  view 
that the presence of NRAs may boost the extent of rated companies in a country and, through 
this, favor financial market development. 
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Fig. 6 Source: Our calculations on Bloomberg data between 1990 and may 2005 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The  introduction  of the  Euro  was  expected  to  deliver  a  buoyant  expansion  of  private 
financial markets in Europe. Nevertheless, according to several observers, the progress of 
European private financial markets has not matched such optimistic expectations. 
In this paper, we asked whether this unsatisfactory outcome may be explained by the fact 
that Europe lacks a potentially important piece of financial infrastructure: namely, it lacks its 
own  rating  agencies.  To  make  our  point,  we  argued  that  more  certified  information  on 
companies is a prerequisite for financial market development and that the presence of national 
rating  agencies  (NRAs)  can  help  in  this  respect.  Our  conjecture  was  that  NRAs  do  not 
substitute but rather complement the presence of the three big players (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, 
the  global  rating  agencies;  GRAs).  Specifically,  we  speculated  that  GRAs  might  have  a 
comparative advantage in rating larger/more internationalized companies while NRAs might 
have a comparative advantage in rating smaller-sized/domestic-focused companies. 
To  prove  our  hypothesis,  we  first  presented  supportive  cursory  evidence.  Our  main 
contribution  was,  however,  to  show  that:  (i)  in  a  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997)  framework,  the 
presence of NRAs associates with more developed financial markets (in terms of both stock 
market capitalization and extent of private bond issuance); (ii) focusing on Asia – the area of 
the world where the presence of NRAs is largest and also the activity of GRAs is considerable 
–  we  can  clearly  identify  a  specialization  pattern  whereby  NRAs  concentrate  on  rating 
smaller-sized/domestic-focused  companies  while  GRAs  dedicate  themselves  to  rating 
larger/more internationalized companies. 
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To conclude, our results support the view that NRAs contribute to the development of 
financial markets. In this light, it is worth noticing that, in spite of the introduction of the 
Euro, private financial market development was much below expectations in Euroland, while 
there was some progress in Asia. Namely, in spite of the potential boost to financial markets 
exerted  in  Europe  by  the  adoption  of  a  common  currency,  the  progress  regarded  mostly 
government securities and not so much private  financial markets. Perhaps there are other 
possible explanations of this, but this outcome seems consistent with the evidence in our 
paper. Specifically, private financial market development is promoted also by the presence of 
NRAs, something (most of) Asia has and Europe lacks.   17 
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